Speech from New Communist Party of Yugoslavia (NKPJ) for the 2nd Session “Ideological Struggles Against Historical Revisionism and Opportunism Today” of the International Colloquium in Belgrade on June 29
Aleksandar Đenić
The lecture analyses the rehabilitation of fascist collaborators and the destruction of the socialist heritage as a result of Serbia’s accession process to the European Union. Legally guaranteed compensation claims are ideologically underpinned by EU resolutions on totalitarianism, which as well fundamentally shape national historiography. On the basis of this, the relation between the struggle for sovereignty and antifascism shell be discussed.
Anti-Totalitarian Totalitarianism as an Ideology
Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, totalitarianism has frequently been the subject of critique, particularly in the context of socialist regimes and the political trials that took place during that period. Within this framework, many Western social theorists have shaped contemporary understandings of the concept. Among the most influential theorists (or pamphleteers) who contributed to the study of totalitarianism are Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, Claude Lefort, Carl Friedrich, Zbigniew Brzezinski, as well as today’s critical readings of the term’s usage by Enzo Traverso.
Hannah Arendt, in her exploration of the origins of totalitarianism, emphasizes that it is deeply rooted in the ideologies of antisemitism and imperialism.[1] According to her, imperialism transcended nationalist politics and expanded through the logic of profit.[2] Imperial empires were maintained through colonial administrations that combined bureaucracy and racism.[3] Arendt argues that antisemitism, imperialism, and totalitarianism represent gradations of evil, with each subsequent form being more severe than the previous one. She insists on the necessity of establishing international relations based on equality. Arendt also holds that Nazi Germany (from 1939 until its collapse) and the Soviet Union (from the 1930s until Stalin’s death) are the only true historical examples of totalitarian regimes.[4] Thus, totalitarian regimes are preceded by totalitarian movements, which are mass organizations composed of isolated individuals.[5]
Raymond Aron, one of the most prominent liberal intellectuals and critics of Marxism, believes that totalitarianism arises in societies where a single political party gains a monopoly over political life and imposes its ideology as official truth. According to Aron, in totalitarian societies, the state exercises absolute control over the means of violence and persuasion, while the media are entirely under state supervision. Economic and governmental activities are controlled by the authorities, and any subjective error by the individual is treated as an ideological error, which serves as a justification for the use of terror.[6]
Claude Lefort, like Arendt, agrees that totalitarianism encompasses political regimes in Eastern Europe, but unlike her, he argues that regimes in that region in the second half of the 20th century also bore characteristics of totalitarianism.[7] Lefort claims that totalitarianism permeates all social relations, creating a one-dimensional hierarchy between those who command and those who obey. This is made possible through the unique intertwining of the state and the party hierarchy. Lefort believes that totalitarianism destroys the public sphere by merging it with political power, making this dynamic a key element of totalitarian regimes.[8]
One of the most cited theoretical frameworks for understanding totalitarianism comes from Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski. They define totalitarianism through six key characteristics, such as
1. An elaborate ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man’s existence to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere, at least passively; this ideology is characteristically focused and projected toward a perfect final state of mankind — that is to say, it contains a chiliastic claim, based upon a radical rejection of the existing society with conquest of the world for the new one.
2. A single mass party typically led by one man, the “dictator,” and consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total population (up to 10 percent) of men and women, a hard core of them passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to the ideology and prepared to assist in every way in promoting its general acceptance, such a party being hierarchically, oligarchically organized and typically either superior to, or completely intertwined with, the governmental bureaucracy.
3. A system of terror, whether physical or psychic, effected through party and secret-police control, supporting but also supervising the party for its leaders, and characteristically directed not only against demonstrable “enemies” of the regime, but against more or less arbitrarily selected classes of the population; the terror whether of the secret police or of party-directed social pressure systematically exploits modern science, and more especially scientific psychology.
4. A technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party and of the government, of all means of effective mass communication, such as the press, radio, and motion pictures.
5. A similarly technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of the effective use of all weapons of armed combat.
6. A central control and direction of the entire economy through the bureaucratic coordination of formerly independent corporate entities, typically including most other associations and group activities.”[9]
On the other hand, Enzo Traverso analyzes the concept of totalitarianism through eight different historical phases. The term was first used during World War I to describe “total war.” Later, it became relevant to a wide range of political currents—from Marxists and liberals to fascists, anti-fascists, anarchists, and conservatives. During the 1920s, Italian anti-fascists began to use the term to describe the fascist regime in Italy, where the “totalitarian system” became synonymous with tyranny, or a new form of governance.
Traverso argues that during the Cold War, totalitarianism took on a new form, becoming synonymous with anti-communism and referring to dictatorship and human rights violations in countries ruled by communist parties. The concept of totalitarianism experienced a theoretical crisis between the 1960s and 1980s, only to reemerge in the 1990s as a theoretical tool for conceptualizing the twentieth century.[10]
Traverso also notes that German antisemitism preceded the Russian Revolution and, during the twentieth century, became a specifically German version of the imperialist idea of continental expansion. He believes that racism was inherent to Western political culture, particularly in England and France, while the Soviet Union exhibited a strong anti-racist, anti-colonial, and internationalist character. Traverso mentions that upon coming to power, the Nazis—aligned with their elite’s historical aspirations for colonial conquest—redirected ideas of pan-Germanism from Africa toward Eastern Europe. He argues that the interpretation of totalitarianism is more of a literary fantasy than an accurate depiction of fascist and communist regimes.
Following the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001, and the beginning of the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, a new chapter in the political and theoretical discussion of totalitarianism began. Since then, the concept has been associated with regimes and movements under the control of Muslim religious fundamentalists. The division between the “free world” and totalitarianism (fascism and communism) was replaced by a clash of civilizations, in which Muslims became the new enemies of the United States and liberal democracy.
According to Traverso, the issue with this term lies in its definition and scope. He believes that ideology remains a key pillar in interpreting totalitarianism. Any form of anti-liberalism is often labeled as totalitarianism. Traverso therefore argues that, historically, totalitarianism played the role of generating a sort of healthy antibiotic for the body of liberal democracy—by stigmatizing its totalitarian enemies, the West justified its own violence and tyranny.[11]
The end of real socialism left liberal democracy without its main enemy, so Islamic fundamentalism took the place of communism, as it opposed the core values of the West. Nazism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism were placed within the same framework, and the Muslim Brotherhood was compared to Lenin’s concept of the vanguard party. According to this logic, the monolithic state ruled by a single party became a characteristic of all anti-democratic and totalitarian ideologies, from Leninism to the Islamic State. Traverso concludes that liberal democracies are gripped by a general paranoia that systematically dehumanizes and destroys their enemies.[12]
A discussion of totalitarianism cannot be understood without grasping its connections to ideology and law. To approach this topic seriously, it is necessary to establish a theoretical framework that enables the analysis of social processes forming the basis of the narrative about totalitarianism. In this context, I would rely on the critique of bourgeois ideology and law developed by Soviet thinkers Peter Stuchka and Evgeny Pashukanis, since the concept of Soviet and socialist law is crucial in analyzing the ideology of totalitarianism in the West. Stuchka and Pashukanis emphasize that all laws, without exception, are ideological, which stands in direct opposition to the claims found in the Law on Rehabilitation.
Stuchka points out that socialist law differs from bourgeois law primarily in that it focuses on the relationships between people; that is, the central question of this law is the relationship of man to man. In bourgeois society, on the other hand, the dead norm dominates man — meaning that man exists for the sake of law, rather than law existing for the sake of man.[13] According to Stuchka, law in every social system defends the interests of the ruling class, and from his perspective, the state functions as an apparatus for enforcing the legal system and ideology of the ruling class. His thesis is that no other system exists because the purpose of the legal system is to keep the masses oppressed in submission. Furthermore, he stresses that regardless of how one views the role of the state and law, there is an inseparable connection between these two phenomena. The fundamental function of the state is to enact laws, protect them, or repeal them, always with the goal of preserving power.[14]
Evgeny Pashukanis, a Soviet legal theorist, believed that legal categories have no meaning other than ideological and that law represents only a subset of general ideology. According to him, law is a “mystified form of a specific social relation,”[15] and the basic premise of the general theory of law must be the understanding of man as a producer in society, just as economic theory starts from economic relations. Pashukanis holds that the economic relation of exchange is the fundamental prerequisite for the existence of legal contracts and that the state, in his view, functions as an instrument of class rule, where authority in capitalist society guarantees the market economy.[16]
Resolutions in the EU Parliament and the Council of Europe on Totalitarianism
From the perspective of liberal democracies, all regimes of “real socialism” in Eastern Europe under the rule of communist parties were considered totalitarian. According to this interpretation, these regimes, together with the Nazi regime in Germany, represented the worst forms of tyranny and dictatorship. European institutions and liberal political parties often portray these regimes as two sides of the same totalitarian coin. To legitimize these claims, there was a need for official condemnation of these regimes. The condemnation was not only moral but also included a legal framework. After the fall of the Eastern Bloc, the Council of Europe adopted numerous resolutions condemning the former socialist regimes.
The Resolution on Measures to Dismantle the Heritage of Former Communist Totalitarian Systems emphasizes that the fundamental goal of transitional processes is to create a pluralistic democracy based on the rule of law and respect for human rights. This includes freedom of choice, economic pluralism, protection of private property, media freedom, development of civil society, as well as decentralization, demilitarization, demonopolization, and debureaucratization of former socialist regimes. The resolution also highlights the need to rehabilitate individuals who were victims of communist crimes, as well as the restitution of property to churches and individuals who were harmed by nationalization, confiscation, or other forms of expropriation by the communist state. Additionally, it underscores the importance of adopting lustration laws, emphasizing that this process must conform to democratic standards. This means individual accountability must be ensured, rather than collective blame, along with the presumption of innocence and the right to appeal. The goal of lustration is not to punish people (that is the task of the judiciary), but to protect the newly established democracy.[17]
Following this, a Resolution Need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes was adopted. It emphasizes that a defining characteristic of these systems was the mass violation of human rights, including collective and individual executions, concentration camps, deportations, torture, forced labor, ethnic and religious persecution, and other forms of violence. According to the authors of the resolution, while techniques and forms of repression varied from country to country, all these regimes shared the absence of political pluralism, “violence against freedom of conscience, thought and expression, and press freedom.” The resolution expresses concern that communist leaders and perpetrators of crimes were not prosecuted after the fall of these regimes, unlike Nazi criminals. It also emphasizes the lack of awareness in European societies about the extent of these crimes. Particularly troubling is the fact that some communist parties continue to operate legally without distancing themselves from crimes committed during socialism. According to the resolution, raising awareness of these crimes is essential to prevent their recurrence. The moral condemnation of such crimes plays a key role in educating future generations. The Assembly stresses that the international community must clearly define its stance toward the past, which “can serve as a reference for future joint actions.” Victims of communist regimes, whether still alive or represented by family members, deserve compassion, understanding, and recognition of their suffering. The Assembly believes these resolutions will pave the way for “reconciliation and encourage historians to continue their work in identifying and verifying what happened.”[18]
In this context, the European Parliament adopted a declaration proclaiming August 23rd as the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism), the date on which the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was signed. The declaration refers to the United Nations Charter on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes, as well as the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It explains that the date was chosen due to a series of secret documents revealing how Molotov and Ribbentrop divided Europe into spheres of influence between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. It stresses that Stalinism and Nazism were responsible for imprisonments, deportations, and torture, which are considered crimes against humanity. The resolution also highlights that the impact of the Soviet regime and occupation on the citizens of post-communist countries, as well as its historical significance, remains little known in Europe.[19]
This declaration was reaffirmed by the The European Parliament resolution of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism. One of the key arguments in this document is that European integration emerged as a response to the suffering caused by the two world wars—Nazi tyranny leading to the Holocaust and the spread of totalitarian, undemocratic communist regimes in Eastern Europe. It also stresses that Europe cannot be fully united until it comes to terms with its past—where Western Europe was under Nazism, and Central and Eastern Europe under Communism. The resolution also condemns the fascist regimes in Portugal, Greece, and Spain and reaffirms the singularity of the Holocaust as a tragic event. Its aim is to develop a common European stance on history and foster an honest discussion about Nazism, Stalinism, Communism, and Fascism, as well as the crimes committed by these regimes. In its first point, the European Parliament expresses solidarity with all victims of totalitarian and undemocratic regimes in Europe and pays tribute to all those who fought against tyranny and oppression.[20]
The most recent resolution in this spirit was adopted by the European Parliament resolution of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe. The emphasis is placed on responsibility for the outbreak of World War II and the division of Europe between the USSR and Nazi Germany, particularly the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which enabled the secret division of Europe. Poland was the first victim, attacked first by Hitler and then by Stalin. The resolution notes that while Western Europe reconciled after World War II, Central and Eastern European countries remained under Soviet occupation and communist dictatorship. The resolution opposes historical revisionism, the justification of collaboration, and Holocaust denial occurring in some EU member states. Stalinism and Communism are treated as synonymous with Nazism, held responsible for murders, deportations, concentration camps, and other crimes against humanity. Consequently, in many EU countries, the propagation of Nazi and Communist ideologies, as well as the use of their symbols, is prohibited. The resolution calls on member states to condemn both regimes and ban the promotion of Nazism and Stalinism, including the removal of monuments and other markers commemorating that period. It further calls for this date to be included in school curricula to raise awareness among younger generations about the history of totalitarian regimes. It recommends May 25 be declared the International Day of Heroes of the Fight Against Totalitarianism, in memory of Witold Pilecki, who was murdered in Auschwitz. The resolution reminds that EU and NATO integration enabled Central and Eastern European countries to rejoin the European community of free democratic nations and brought socio-economic development. It calls for the fight against racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, and discrimination against sexual and other minorities. Additionally, it underscores the need to understand communist crimes and urges European nations to confront extremist ideologies like Nazism and Communism, along with their propaganda, regimes, and symbols. In this context, it emphasizes that the Russian people suffered greatly under communist totalitarianism and calls on Russia and its leaders to confront their totalitarian past and cease glorifying or denying communist crimes.[21]
The European Parliament, in its resolution from 17 January 2024, addresses how Europe deals with its past, recognizing both the challenges and the opportunities involved. It highlights various initiatives aimed at creating a shared European memory, such as Holocaust Remembrance Day, the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, and funding programs like “Europe for Citizens” and “Citizenship, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV).” It also notes earlier Parliament resolutions that deal with Europe’s historical awareness.[22]
However, the Parliament expresses concern that there are still competing and sometimes incompatible narratives about history across Europe, especially between Western and Eastern countries, as well as within regions. Despite differences, all European nations share interconnected historical experiences. The resolution acknowledges the crimes of Nazi, fascist, and communist regimes, as well as colonialism, and how these have shaped Europe’s view of history. It stresses the importance of overcoming regional and ideological divides to promote mutual understanding and respectful dialogue.
Additionally, the Parliament notes the growing influence of digital media in education. While digital tools offer opportunities, there is concern about their misuse—especially for spreading disinformation and manipulating historical facts, as seen in Russian revisionist narratives related to the war in Ukraine. The resolution calls on the European Commission and Member States to strengthen digital and media literacy and equip teachers and students with the necessary tools to critically assess historical information using reliable and contextualized sources.
In many EU countries, as part of the decommunization process, the use of communist symbols, as well as symbols from the era of former socialist countries, has been banned. For example, Estonia passed a law in 2006 prohibiting the politically motivated display of Soviet and Nazi symbols in public places.[23] The Estonian Parliament adopted this document on January 24, 2007, and the law bans the use of flags, coats of arms, and slogans of the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Nazi Party of Germany, and the SS units.[24]
Another Baltic country, Lithuania, banned the use of Soviet and Nazi symbols in 2008[25], threatening violators with fines. In 2015, Lithuania also prohibited the organization of gatherings featuring Soviet and Nazi iconography.[26]
In June 2013, the Latvian Parliament passed a law banning the display of Soviet and Nazi symbols at all public events. This ban includes flags, anthems, uniforms, the swastika, as well as the hammer and sickle.[27]
In addition to the Baltic countries, bans on the use of totalitarian symbols have also been adopted in other former socialist EU member states. In Poland, the use of communist and other totalitarian symbols was banned in 2009, except for artistic, educational, collector, and academic purposes.[28] However, in 2011, the Constitutional Court declared this ban unconstitutional due to a violation of freedom of expression. Nonetheless, in 2017, Poland adopted a Decommunization Law, which also included the removal of Soviet propaganda monuments.[29]
In Romania, a National Security Law was passed in 1991 (before the adoption of the aforementioned resolutions on totalitarianism), which prohibits initiating, organizing, or supporting any totalitarian or extremist activities, including communist, fascist, legionary, racist, revisionist, separatist, and other organizations that could threaten the country’s territorial integrity and the rule of law.[30]
In Bulgaria, lawmakers adopted a law in 2016 banning the public use of communist symbols. This law mandates the removal of signs and objects created during the communist regime that glorify the former Bulgarian Communist Party and its leaders from public spaces, as well as the prohibition of placing and using such symbols in public areas.[31]
The Law on Legal Rehabilitation and the EU Accession Policy
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many former socialist countries began to reexamine their historical narratives. Countries aspiring to join the European Union generally adopted laws condemning political persecution during the socialist period. These laws were often aligned with the resolutions and declarations of the European Parliament, which condemned all totalitarian regimes—interpreting this as a condemnation of all regimes led by communist parties, regardless of their actual character or historical transformations. The Law on Legal Rehabilitation in Serbia is part of the state’s policy of EU accession and its reckoning with the socialist past. In order for Serbia to become an EU member, negotiation chapters are opened as part of the accession process, and the country harmonizes its legal system with EU-prescribed standards.
Since the beginning of negotiations between the EU and Serbia, the European Parliament has adopted an annual resolution reporting on the progress of the talks. In its 2014 resolution, referring to the 2013 negotiations, point 13 calls on the Government of Serbia to fully and non-discriminatorily implement the Law on Rehabilitation.[32] In the 2015 resolution, referring to the 2014 negotiations, point 29 again calls on the Serbian Government to implement the law without discrimination.[33] In the same year, in its 2015 report, the European Parliament once again reminds the Serbian Government of its obligation to fully implement the Law on Rehabilitation.[34] Following this report, no specific reports on the Law on Rehabilitation were issued in the following years, as the deadline for submitting requests expired in 2016, five years after the law was passed.[35]
The Law on Rehabilitation was adopted in Serbia in 2006 and amended in 2011. Although there was broad consensus among parliamentary parties regarding the basic principles of this law, there were disagreements concerning its specific provisions. This applied to both the original adoption and the amendment, with parties voting against the law not due to its general purpose, but due to certain characteristics of its proposals.[36] The 2011 amendment, specifically Article 2, clearly stipulated that members of occupying and collaborationist forces do not have the right to initiate property restitution proceedings.[37] The law was supported by 121 members of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.[38]
According to this law, Article 1 emphasizes that any individual who was deprived of rights, life, liberty, or any other right by judicial, military, or administrative decision for political, religious, national, or ideological reasons (either on the territory of the Republic of Serbia or abroad, provided that the person was or is currently a citizen of the Republic of Serbia), has the right to submit a request for legal rehabilitation. However, individuals who died in armed conflicts in Serbia during World War II, as well as members of occupying and collaborationist forces, did not have the right to rehabilitation. Additionally, the law clearly states that the Republic of Serbia bears no responsibility for actions committed by occupying forces during World War II. Similarly, Article 2 of the law emphasizes that members of occupying and collaborationist forces, who committed war crimes and occupied parts of the territory of the Republic of Serbia, cannot be rehabilitated, nor can property be returned to them
Rehabilitation could be carried out either through a legal or judicial process.
According to the law, the right to rehabilitation was granted to individuals whose rights and freedoms had been violated without a court or administrative decision. The law covered persons who, based on such decisions, were deprived of liberty for supporting the Informbiro Resolution of 1948, and who spent time in the prisons and camps of the FPRY (Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia) from 1949 to 1955. It also included those convicted under the principle of collective responsibility for war crimes, who neither lost their Yugoslav citizenship nor participated in war crimes. The law also provided for the rehabilitation of individuals whose citizenship was revoked and entire property confiscated, based on the Decree of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the FPRY from March 8, 1947.
The rehabilitation process could be initiated by a request, and the right to submit such a request was granted not only to the affected individuals but also to their “spouses, common-law partners, children (legitimate, illegitimate, adopted), stepchildren, descendants, ancestors, adoptive parents, siblings, other legal heirs, testamentary heirs, and legal entities of which the person was a member or founder.” The process could also be initiated by a public prosecutor, as well as by children born in institutions for the execution of sanctions or raised without their parents who had been accused for political reasons.
This law was under the jurisdiction of the Higher Court, and requests were decided upon by a single judge. The rehabilitation process was conducted as a non-contentious procedure under the rules for non-litigious proceedings. The court had the authority to conduct a bilateral procedure in cases where the other party was the Republic of Serbia, represented by the competent public prosecutor. Individuals rehabilitated under this law regained their civil rights, as well as the right to special pension service, monthly financial compensation, healthcare, and other rights related to health insurance. They were also entitled to the return of confiscated or seized property, compensation for material and non-material damage, and rehabilitation-based restitution. The right to appeal was granted within 30 days of the decision to the Court of Appeals; after the decision became final, no appeal was allowed.[39]
By implementing the Law on Rehabilitation in Serbia, more than 3,000 people were rehabilitated—mostly those convicted of war crimes during World War II.[40] Among the most well-known rehabilitated figures were: the Karađorđević royal family, Dragiša Cvetković, and Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović. However, the rehabilitation of Milan Nedić was rejected. In addition, members of the Ustaše movement,[41] approximately 300 members of the SS Division “Prinz Eugen”, members of the Handžar Division, as well as individuals who served in the quisling militia under Nedić’s leadership and members of the Serbian Volunteer Corps—Dimitrije Ljotić’s fascist movement—were also rehabilitated.[42]
Although the law clearly stated that members of occupying and quisling formations who had been convicted of war crimes or had died in combat during World War II had no right to submit rehabilitation requests, such requests were submitted—and many were even approved. After rehabilitation, the heirs of these individuals requested the return of confiscated property from the Restitution Agency, as they were entitled to it under the Law on Rehabilitation. The Chetnik movement, according to this law, was not considered a collaborationist force, since as early as 2004—before the adoption of the Law on Rehabilitation—a parliamentary majority (composed of the Democratic Party of Serbia and the Democratic Party) passed a law that equated the Chetnik and Partisan movements. All parliamentary parties voted for this law, except the Socialist Party of Serbia.[43]
This law cannot be viewed outside the historical and political context in which it was created. In addition to its anti-communist narrative, it reflects the confusion in interpreting the past. Judicial practice related to the Law on Rehabilitation reveals the complexity and confusion that exist in Serbian society regarding this issue. Critical readings and analyses of totalitarianism, which explore the dehumanization of political opponents, explain how anti-totalitarian discourse is used to condemn communism, but also—in post-socialist societies—to rehabilitate anti-communist movements, regardless of their fascist and/or collaborationist nature.
Conclusion
Although the European Union is formally founded on the principles of anti-fascism, in reality, there is a certain tolerance towards neo-fascist and collaborationist movements, particularly in former socialist countries that are now EU member states or candidates for membership. By ignoring a critical analysis of history, Eastern Europe is witnessing the normalization and rehabilitation of individuals who were convicted of the most severe war crimes. As a result, some of the worst war criminals and their movements have suddenly been rebranded as “fighters for democracy and human rights.” Their crimes are relativized, while they themselves are proclaimed as victims.
Numerous resolutions adopted by EU institutions and implemented within national judicial systems aim to condemn “real socialism” as totalitarian dictatorships and equate them with German National Socialism. Any criticism of liberalism and the EU as ideological constructs can easily be labeled as support for totalitarianism. Anti-communist resolutions and declarations adopted across Europe have created the necessary “conscience” of the continent. Thanks to a selective interpretation of history taken out of context, according to the logic of resolutions on totalitarianism, it turns out that communists and Nazis were allies waging a joint struggle against the “democratic” West. This ideological offensive was intended to discredit alternatives to neoliberal processes, which nationalists have used to rehabilitate their own policies (within the broader context of “divide and rule”).
The resolutions of the Council of Europe clearly reveal a pattern through which former socialist countries of Eastern Europe have been dismantled, based on the propagandist pamphlets of Carl Friedrich, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, and Claude Lefort on totalitarianism. This pattern has been applied across Eastern Europe. However, this leads to a logical contradiction—the resolutions that claim to oppose monism, in fact, impose a monism of thought. These decisions are dominated by an anti-communist narrative that dehumanizes communists and constructs an anti-totalitarian discourse, while simultaneously tacitly rehabilitating anti-communist movements in post-socialist societies, regardless of their fascist and/or collaborationist nature.
Literature:
2013 progress report on Serbia European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2014 on the 2013 progress report on Serbia(2013/2880(RSP)) P8_TA-PROV(2016)0046
Arent, Hana. Izvori totalitarizma. Beograd: Feministička izdavačka kuća 94, 1999.
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Džinić, Firdus, Sovjetske teorije prava. Zagreb: Globus, 1984.
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European Parliament resolution on the importance of European remberence for the future of the Europe (2019/2819(RSP))
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Ramon, Aron, Demokratija i totalitarizam. Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižica Zorana Stojanovića, 1997.
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Rezoluciju Saveta Evrope 1096 (1996.)
Rezoluciju Saveta Evrope 1481 (2006.)
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Traverso, Enzo. “Totalitarism between history and theory.” Wesleyan University (2017): 97-118.
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Audi featuring Soviet symbols banned from entering Lihuania. The Balthic Times. 11. 4. 2015.
Estonia Proposes Ban on Sovier, Nazi Symbols. Radio Free Europe. 30. 11. 2006.
Latvia bans the use of USSR symbols during public events. Baltic New Network. 11. 4. 2013.
Moscow stung by Estonian ban on totalitarianism“s symbols. EURASIA Daily Monitor. 26. 1. 2017.
Nema više rehabilitacija, Danas, 14. 12. 2016.
New Polish law equates Comunist and Nazi symbols. RT. 5. 10. 2009
Parliament Passes Amendments to Act Declaring the Criminal Nature of the Communist Regime in Bulgaria, BulgarianNews Agency, 24. 11. 2016.
Porodica ustaše traži kuću u Zemunu. Blic. 11. 08. 2018.
Russia warns Poland not to touch Soviet WW2 memorials. BBC News. 31.07.2017.
Stranke većine najavile podršku Zakona o rehabilitaciji. Blic. 22.11.2011.
Sud vratio čast za 300 Hitlerovih jurišnika. Novosti. 25. 12. 2018.
U Srbiji zvanično izjednačeni pripadnici partizanskog i četničkog pokreta. SW. 13. 12. 2004.
Usvojen Zakon o rehabilitaciji. 021. 5. 2. 2011.
Vraćena čast 3000 ljudi, isplaćeno 195 miliona odštete. Novosti. 3.6.2018.
[1] Arent Hana, Izvori totalitarizma, (Beograd: Feministička izdavačka kuća 94, 1999), 29 – 42.
[2] Ibid, str. 157;
[3] Ibid, str. 190 – 191;
[4] Ibid., Predgovor trećem delu;
[5] Ibid, str. 349 – 393
[6] Ramon Aron, Demokratija i totalitarizam, (Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižica Zorana Stojanovića, 1997), 283.
[7] Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society, (Cambridge: The Mit Press, 1986), 52 – 59;
[8] Ibid, str. 273 – 318;
[9] Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzenski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, (Cambridge: MA: Harvard Universit pres, 1956), 9-10.
[10] Traverso, Enco. (2017) Totalitarism between history and theory, Wesleyan University, Vol 56, p. 100.
[11] Ibid, str. 101 – 114;
[12] Ibid, str. 114 – 116.
[13] Firdus Džinić, Sovjetske teorije prava, (Zagreb: Globus, Zagreb, 1984), 18.
[14] Ibid, str. 20 – 34.
[15] Ibid, 80 – 200.
[16] Ibid, str. 206-226.
[17] Rezoluciju Saveta Evrope 1096 (1996.);
[18] Rezoluciju Saveta Evrope 1481 (2006.);
[19] Grupa autora, Stigma totalitarizma, (Novi Sad: AKO, 2014), 21.
[20] European conscience and totalitarianism, P6_TA(2009)0213;
[21] European Parlament resolution on the importance of European remberence for the future of the Europe, 18.
[22] European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2024 on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for thiacloprid in or on certain products (COM(2023)0739 – 2023/3005(RPS))
[23] “Estonia Proposes Ban on Sovier, Nazi Symbols.” Radio Free Europe. 30. 11. 2006.
[24] “Moscow stung by Estonian ban on totalitarianism“s symbols.” EURASIA Daily Monitor. 26. 1. 2017.
[25]“Lithuanian ban on Soviet symbols.” BBC News. 17. 5. 2008.
[26]“Audi featuring Soviet symbols banned from entering Lihuania.”The Balthic Times. 11. 4. 2015.
[27] “Latvia bans the use of USSR symbols during public events.” Baltic New Network. 11. 4. 2013.
[28]“New Polish law equates Comunist and Nazi symbols.” RT. 5. 10. 2009.
[29]“Russia warns Poland not to touch Soviet WW2 memorials.” BBC News. 31.07.2017.
[30] Law on the National Security of Romania The Law No. 51/July 29, 1991 – Law on the National Security of Romania – was published in the “Monitrul Oficial“ (Official Gazette of Romania), Part I, No. 163, August 7, 1991.
[31] Parliament Passes Amendments to Act Declaring the Criminal Nature of the Communist Regime in Bulgaria, Bulgarian News Agency, 24.11. 2016.
[32] 2013 progress report on Serbia European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2014 on the 2013 progress report on Serbia(2013/2880(RSP)) P8_TA-PROV(2016)0046.
[33] Rezolucija Evropskog parlamenta od 11. marta 2015. o izvještaju o napretku Srbije za 2014.
[34] Report on Serbia; 2015 progress report on Serbia European Parliament resolution of 4 February 2016 on the 2015 report on Serbia(2015/2892(RSP))
[35] Nema više rehabilitacija, Danas, 14. 12. 2016.
[36] Stranke većine najavile podršku Zakona o rehabilitacij Blic, 22.11.2011.
[37] Zakon o rehabilitaciji (Službeni glasnik RS “broj 92/2011).
[38] Usvojen Zakon o rehabilitaciji, 021, 5. 2. 2011.
[39] Opt. cit. Zakon o rehabilitaciji (Službeni glasnik RS “broj 92/2011)
[40] “Vraćena čast 3000 ljudi, isplaćeno 195 miliona odštete.” Novosti. 3.6.2018.
[41] “Porodica ustaše traži kuću u Zemunu”. Blic. 11. 08. 2018.
[42] “Sud vratio čast za 300 Hitlerovih jurišnika.” Novosti. 25. 12. 2018.
[43] “U Srbiji zvanično izjednačeni pripadnici partizanskog i četničkog pokreta.” SW. 13. 12. 2004.
